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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to gather information regarding
children's developing sense of self.

Seventy children, ages three to

seven years, were tested on three measures.

In the first task, the

children tried on a mask and answered questions about their identity
while looking in a mirror.

The second involved a group of conservation

tasks where external objects, the child's body, or part thereof, were
the objects in question.

The third was a picture task where pictures of

a person, a person wearing a mask, and an animal were compared and the
children were asked to decide which two of the pictures were most alike.
The results indicated that the three measures were not correlated with
one another.

The mask task seemed to separate the three and four year

olds from the older children.

The conservation tasks involving the

child's entire body separated the 3, 4, and 5 year old children from the
6 and 7 year olds.

The picture task also separated the 3, 4, and 5 year

olds from the older children, and the more standard conservation tasks
separated the seven year olds from the younger children.

The results

are discussed in terms of a theory of development of self identity.
Based on a Piagetian framework, a hypothesis for a more global view of
children's play is also presented.

viii

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

There has been a great deal of anecdotal evidence to indicate
that children "believe" in their make-believe enough to do very out-ofthe-ordinary things.

Every so often there is a newspaper account of a

child falling from a window or building while trying to fly after read
ing or seeing Peter Pan or while pretending to be superman or spiderman.
A further correlate of this phenomenon, as Brim (1976) mentions, is "the
treasured stories and legends about metamorphosis in children, for
example, Alice in Wonderland, Peter Pan and Snow White, which are espe
cially poignant because they engage children's fascination with possible
transformation of self" (p. 250).

To what degree children "believe" in

their ability to change into something or someone different than them
selves, and whether there is a developmental sequence involved in this
process formed the questions which were the instigation of this study.
The broader purpose of this investigation involves children's understand
ing of themselves as separate psychological and physical entities whose
basic properties can not magically change.

It would seem to make sense

that this kind of understanding of self would be influenced by the
child's level of cognitive development and the way in which he under.
stands the world.
The kind of understanding of oneself that is referred to here is
one's sense of self as a single entity and as a causal agent.
1

The
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distinction made here is the same as the one made by Wylie (1961) in an
extensive review of the Self-Concept literature.

According to English

and English (1958), the word "self" has two predominant meanings in psy
chology:

(a) the self as subject or agent, and (b) the self as the

individual that is known to oneself.

The second definition is generally

what is referred to as one's "self concept."
one that is intended here.

The first meaning is the

The "sense of self" that is referred to is

less involved with introspection than is self concept.

It is more

involved with the physical properties of the individual as well as the
continuance over time of oneself as an entity.
After a review of the literature done on Self-Concept in the
last 10 years, it was found that the research was heavily directed
toward the constructs of ideal-self, perceived social self (how you
think others perceive you), and measures of self-esteem and the vari
ables which may effect one's self-esteem.

Generally, the idea of Self-

Concept was portrayed as how "good" or how "bad" you evaluate yourself.
These kinds of studies do not address the issue of how one comes to know
oneself as an entity, but begin by assuming that one does know oneself,
and ask questions about how "good" oneself or others evaluate that self.
The idea of self as subject or agent seems to have been largely
ignored.

How one comes to know that one is a "self," and the extent of

that "self," is a question that very few researchers have asked.

The

kind of question that is being asked here seems to be more basic than
the questions addressed by most researchers in the area of Self-Concept.
Whether knowing oneself as a "self" is a precursor to being able to
evaluate oneself is not yet known.

Perhaps research into the
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development of one's sense of self might be related to research involv
ing the locus of self esteem.

If young children tend to evaluate them

selves as others do, while older children have progressively internal
ized evaluations of themselves, then perhaps this may be indicative of a
more well defined sense of self as the child grows older.
Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough and Karp (1962) found that
children's drawings of a person rated on a five point scale signifi
cantly correlated with how they performed on orientation tasks in the
laboratory.

Based on a number of measures, children who were classified

as field-dependent generally produced unarticulated drawings, while
children classified as field-independent generally produced a highly
detailed drawing of a person.

The authors imply that there is a con-

nection between how differentiated one's sense of self is (drawing of a
person) and how dependent upon the external environment is one's orien
tation.

If children generally become more field independent as they

grow older, then perhaps this is indicative of a more well defined sense
of self.

However, much more research is needed if the concept of sense

of self is to be linked with the rest of the vast Self-Concept research.
This study investigated children's belief in their ability to be
transformed into something or someone else.

It also measured the child's

level of cognitive development and whether the child's level of cogni
tive development was related to the extent to which he perceives of him
self as transformable.

If belief in the transformation of self and the

child's level of cognitive development were related, then children's
understanding of themselves may be linked to their cognitive development
in terms of the world.

Further, children's make-believe in general
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may be understood as reflective of children's growing cognitive abili
ties and their growing understanding of the world.
Much of Piaget's work and theory is directed to the child's
understanding of the world about him.

The focus here involves the

child's understanding of himself, both as a part of the world and as
separate from it.

Naturally, these two overlap, since much of the

child's understanding of himself results from his interaction with the
world.

It may be generally stated that children interact with their

world by either imitating, learning (both experiencing and understand
ing), or playing in their environment (Singer, 1973).

Theories of Make-Believe Play

There have been many reviews of children's play (Berlyne, 1969;
Gilmore, 1966; Herron & Sutton-Smith, 1971; Klinger, 1971; Millar, 1968;
Singer, 1973; Smilansky, 1968).

Briefly, the current theories of make-

believe or fantasy play fall into three categories:

emotionally acti

vated fantasy, preparatory or practice play for later life activities,
and symbolic play as an extension of the child's general level of cogni
tive functioning.

That there are three divergent theories of why chil

dren play has been a theoretical problem in the area of play for a long
time.

It may be that these divergent explanations of the origin of play

occur because the authors view only some of children's play as meaning
ful and the rest as simply entertainment or "wasted time" (Singer, 1973).
The theory that children's play is an imitation of or practice/
play for future life demands and events originated with Groos (1901).
This theoretical viewpoint generally depicts play in terms of the
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child's future, not his current situation.

In this explanation, play is

directly functional in terms of preparing for a job, getting married,
raising children, etc.

Children's play is a constant preparation to

become an adult, in a very concrete sense.

Certainly, some of chil

dren's play is imitation or practice play for upcoming events, but there
also seems to be a large body of play activities which cannot be cate
gorized along these lines.

Pretending to be an animal or superman is

not preparing the child for a possible future role.
children imitate adults.

It is clear that

It is much less clear that this imitation is

future directed and has implications for the child's career choice, etc.
Another theory of children's play is derived from psychoanalytic
theory (Freud, 1958) and basically states that play is an extension of
children's affective lives and that children use play to work out con
flicts or problem situations (Millar, 1968).

Again, it seems hard to

deny that some of children's play is directed by their affective lives,
but it does not appear reasonable to assume that the enormous variety of
play activities that children engage in are all related to children's
"real life" interactions with their parents or peers.

Both of these

theories of play focus on some aspects of play while ignoring others.
Both are also based primarily on the content of play rather than the
process or act of make-believe itself, regardless of content.
The third theory, generally attributable to Piaget (1962),
focuses on make-believe (he refers to it as symbolic play) as a natural
extension of the child's current level of cognitive functioning in the
world.

Piaget explains the advent of symbolic play by invoking the

basic processes of thought, assimilation and accommodation.

i
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Assimilation refers to the child's taking in information and fitting it
into his already constructed schemes or action hypotheses.

Accommoda

tion is the development of new schemes or a modification of existing
schemes in order to understand or categorize information that does not
lend itself to direct assimilation.

Assimilation involves fitting the

world into the child's already established schemes.

Accommodation

involves changing the scheme to more closely fit the external world.
Adaptive thought, bringing about the growth of intelligence, involves
both of these processes.

The closer their functioning is to being in

equilibrium (i.e., with respect to the ratio of assimilation and accom
modation), the more adaptive is the thought process.

Intelligence, then,

involves an equilibrium between the two processes, assimilation and
accommodation.

The closer these two are to being in equilibrium, the

closer the child's understanding of the world will correspond to
"objective" reality.

Play, in this theory, is the occurrence of the

primacy of assimilation over accommodation.

In

play, the child does

not change his schemes to understand the world, he alters the world (via
symbolic or make-believe play) to fit his already existing schemes.
assimilates the world to his viewpoint.

He

If the world does not readily

fit into his limited understanding, rather than change his understanding
through accommodation, the child alters the environment through makebelieve to fit his present conceptions.

For Piaget, play is not a

unique activity of the child, but fits readily into his theory of cogni
tive development as a corollary of the process of intellectual develop
ment.

Singer (1973) supports Piaget's position, pointing out that it

makes much more sense to view make-believe play as part of an overall
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assimilation within a limited range of cognitive schemes than to postu
late play as a defensive or conflict reducing behavior.

Millar (1968),

too, seems to agree with Piaget's position that make-believe play is
really a process of thinking in action with real objects as props.

It

seems that make-believe play may be understood by examining children's
cognitive development.

Make-believe involving the transmutability of

the self may also fit into this theory of cognitive development.
Piaget's theory is currently the most clearly articulated and integra
tive of children's cognitive development.

Piaget's Theory of Make-Believe Play

Piaget's theory of symbolic play is most clearly illustrated in
his book Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood (1962).

In this work,

Piaget lists the usual criteria of play (an end in itself, spontaneous,
pleasurable, lacking organization) and explains how they are all met by
referring to play as simply a predominance of assimilation.
involves assimilation.

All thought

Symbolic play is distinctive in that it subordi

nates accommodation instead of being in equilibrium with it.

Symbolic

play is related to adapted thought but it differs in degree of accommo
dation, forming one pole of the thought process.

Imitation is separate

from this since it does not involve symbolism, but repetition.

For

Piaget, symbolic play is mental assimilation while imitation is sensori
motor assimilation.

Imitation is action oriented, with the child repro

ducing what has struck him, pleased him, or which he feels makes him
more a part of his environment.

Symbolic play differs since the symbols

can move play in new directions, further and further removed from simple
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practice.

Symbolic play is representational:

objects "stand for" other

i

objects and the activities quickly expand beyond imitation into entirely
new interactions.
After the age of two years, the symbolic function becomes more
and more available to the child.

The child leaves the stage of sensori

motor intelligence and enters into the realm of preconceptual represen
tation where the symbols make up the very structure of the child's
thought.

The symbols allow expansion beyond imitation, but are ego

centric in nature, and since they are unique to the child, not yet con
ventional in the sense of shared social signs.

The image or signifier

that is available to the child remains only within the scope of indi
vidual thought, while the sign is always social.

This is what Piaget

refers to when he speaks of the child's thought as being egocentric and
why some of children's make-believe is incomprehensible to the adult.
The child's individualistic symbols may have no meaning to an adult
.

observer, or they may mean something very different to the child than
they mean to the adult.
Freud hypothesized that symbolism arose because the content of
the symbols was repressed.

Groos (1901) hypothesized that symbolism

arose because there is so much in the world that the child cannot yet
understand.

Both of these explanations are missing the point according

to Piaget, since the formation of the symbol is not due to its content
but to the very structure of the child's thought.

In play, the object

that the child uses as a symbol of something else becomes more than just
a representation of that something else, it becomes its substitute, as
if it actually were the symbolized other.

In cognitive representation
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(where there is an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation)
there is adaptation to the signified (i.e., what the object "stands
for"), and the corresponding symbol-object is only one representative of
a general class.

In play, the symbol-object has a meaning and existence

in and of itself.

In cognitive representation the symbol remains sym

bolic, it "stands for" something else.

For the child, the play symbol

becomes a substitute, it "is" the other, not merely a representation.
From Piaget's (1962) point of view,symbolic play is not a unique
case different from the child's other means of cognitive functioning.
It simply is one form of thought, derived from the child's current level
of cognitive structure.

Symbolic play is distinguished from adapted

thought in that it is not directed toward an understanding of a collec
tive or "objective" truth, but to an individual truth whose aim is sat
isfaction of the ego.

In this sense, because the child's thought is not

directed toward a collective understanding, but to satisfaction of only
the self, there is no reason to suppose that the child does not believe
in his own way whatever he chooses to be real.

The child seems to enjoy

a private reality all his own that is believed in spontaneously, without
reflection.

As Piaget (1962) says, "the two to four year old child does

not consider whether his [make-believe] symbols are real or not.

For

him it is a question that does not arise, because symbolic play is
direct satisfaction of the ego and has its own kind of belief, which is
subjective reality" (p. 168).

This subjective reality gives rise to

what Piaget refers to as a preconcept, where there is assimilation to a
specific object without any generalization to all such objects.

Later,

from the age of four or five to about six or eight, preconcepts become
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more generalized and tend toward operational concepts; generality is
gradually achieved, and operations become reversible.

During this time,

the child's thought becomes less egocentric, resulting in a more gen
eralized assimilation and an extension of accommodation.
Briefly, the sequence is as follows:

(a) in the sensori-motor

stage, assimilation and accommodation are always in the present without
symbolic thought; (b) in the preconceptual stage, symbolic thought
arises, allowing earlier assimilations and accommodations to be recalled
and interfere with those of the present.

Yet, the objects of thought

are still only one particular object to another particular object and do
not represent generalized classes as such; (c) in operational thought
accommodation and assimilation are in equilibrium and classes or gen
eralized schemas are compared one with another rather than just parti
cular instances of each.

Cognitive Development as it Relates
to the Sense of Self

During the stage of cognitive development which Piaget refers to
as the sensori-motor period, the child's understanding of the world goes
through a process of decentration.

Simply stated, the child discovers

that everything does not stem from himself and that objects have an
existence which is independent of himself.

The child gradually views

the world in a less egocentric way and slowly realizes that there are
other points of view besides his own.

Obviously this process does not

stop at the end of this period, but for the most part, Piaget directs
himself to the child's understanding of the external world and only

11
briefly to the reciprocal process, whereby, if the world becomes separate
from the child, then the child must become separate from the world.
For Piaget (1972), the young child does not really conceive of
himself as a psychological entity whose thoughts, feelings, and motiva
tions are separate from other people, or even from the physical world.
An example is Piaget's (1962) reporting of his daughter (J) around age
two.

She "separated herself according to the images she saw of herself,

into J. in the glass, J. doing that, and J. in the photo.

[For her],

the same individual [herself] can be comprised of several distinct per
sons, each person differing according to the clothes worn or the images
presented in a mirror or a photograph" (p. 226).

The young child does

not view himself as having a consistent identity through time.
child cannot put the pieces together to form a composite whole.

The
In cog

nitive terms, the child does not yet understand the concept of the indi
vidual elements comprising a general class, in this case, the class of
self.

The self is a class made up of all of the individual instances of

a single person.

The person wearing different clothes from day to day,

standing up or sitting down, when they were an infant or when they were
five, are all subsets of the class "self."
Piaget (1954) believes that the development of the concept of
self follows from the child's discovery and understanding of a permanent
universe.

After attaining object permanence, the child no longer views

himself as the cause of all external events, but his perception of him
self as a causal agent separate from other things, represents a growing
sense of self, both as opposed to other things and in a cause and effect
relationship with them.
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Piaget (1962) talks of this stage of development and the child's
view of himself as one of "participation," where the child can directly
identify one element with another, without understanding that the sum of
the elements constitute a whole.

The child recognizes objects as simi

lar and can compare them on a one-to-one basis, but the concept of the
sum of them forming a generalized class is still beyond him.

The

child's understanding of himself is not essentially different from the
child's understanding of other objects, and the child's make-believe too
follows the same pattern.

The preconcept and the child's make-believe

symbols are both based on a predominance of assimilation, without the
accommodation that the objects form a general class.
Since Piaget's explanation seems to describe and account for the
child's understanding of objects, his understanding of himself, and his
propensity for make-believe, Piaget s theoretical stance gains stature.
If the child's thought is operating at a certain level of development
■•
where assimilation predominates, then this same level of cognitive
development should explain the child's symbolic play and conception of
self.

If, as Piaget asserts, the child's level of cognitive development

precludes adult operations in dealing with the world, then it should also
hold true for all of the child's mental operations, including the child's
understanding of himself.
,

Much research has been done and much has been written about
Piaget's theory with respect to cognitive development in terns of the
child's interaction with and understanding of the world.

There has been

much less research in the area of the child's developing understanding
of himself.

13

Experimental Evidence for a
Developing Sense of Self

Theories of children's development of a concept of self as
related to their developing cognitive abilities are generally lacking
experimental evidence to support them.

One study by Bell (1970),

relates Piaget's theory to the development of other person permanence
(not the self) as opposed to object permanence during the sensori-motor
period.

Bell found that the majority of children developed person-

permanence with respect to their mother before they understood the con
cept of object permanence.

The development of person-permanence did not

always precede the development of object permanence however, and it was
confounded with the quality of the attachment between mother and child.
Though this study did not deal directly with the child's understanding
of himself, it seems to imply that concepts about other people may
appear before the analogous concepts involving inanimate objects.

It

must be noted though that other people and inanimate objects are both
external objects and if the dimension of internal vs. external is more
important than the dimension of people vs. inanimate objects, then
Bell's study may not have implications for the development of an under
standing of self.
Feffer and Gourevitch (1960) touched on the concept of self in
their research investigating role-taking in children.

They found that

their role-taking task which involved taking the point of view of
another, was positively correlated with both age and several Piagetian
tasks.

Even when the scores were controlled for age, the role-taking

task was significantly related to the Piagetian tasks.

Though their
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work did not directly involve the children's sense of self, in order to
think of ones self as an entity, one must be able to look at oneself as
if from outside, as if one were another looking at oneself.

The process

of decentration thus may have implications for understanding oneself as
well as the external world.
Murray (1969) did attempt to directly measure children's under
standing of themselves in terms of conservation of their own bodies.
His first and second grade subjects seemed to be acquiring conservation
of mass, weight, and volume of a clay ball before they conserved these
same qualities regarding their own bodies.

Murray's data appear to con

tradict what one might expect from Bell's (1970) research, where babies
gained person-permanence before object permanence, but as was said
before, the more salient dimension may be internal/external rather than
person/object.
A study by Guardo (1968) attempted to map a developmental
sequence for the attainment of the concept of self.

Her cross-sectional

study of kindergarten through third grade children indicated that chil
dren tend to conceive of themselves first in terms of sexuality, fol
lowed by a sense of humanness, and then individuality.

The children's

sense of self as continuous over time was much less certain than the
other three concepts and was postulated to be a later developing concept.
This last result is interesting since it relates very well to what
Piaget (1962) mentioned about his daughter when she did not understand
that the individual instances comprise a composite whole.
Generally, the studies mentioned thus far have only skirted the
question of the child's developing sense of self as it relates to the
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child's cognitive development.

Another area of research that also

touches on the understanding of the child's sense of self is the work
being done in the area of fantasy play and its relationship with cogni
tive development.
Gould (1972), in a large observational study of children's fan
tasy play in a naturalistic setting>found some developmental trends that
lead to speculation about cognitive correlates.

It was found that as a

group, the three year olds "swung" more freely from reality to fantasy
than did the four and five year olds.

Gould's concept of "fluctuating

certainty" also seems to reflect the distinctions between the age groups.
Fluctuating certainty is defined as "the child's more or less frequent
and transient inability to distinguish firmly between a pretend and a
real danger" (p. 6).

Many of the young children in Gould's study acted

as if the pretend episode in which they were engaged confronted them
with real danger.

Many of their fear reactions to the pretend situation

were not part of the fantasy and usually ended the "game."

With the

younger children in the sample, there was a good deal of fluctuating
certainty, but beyond the age of three and one half to four, the amount
of fluctuating certainty seemed to be more of an individual difference
than a group trend.

Gould makes a clear distinction between believing

one's own make-believe to the extent of becoming fearful (gone around
age 2 - 2h) and believing the make-believe of another to a sufficient
degree to become scared.

Three to five year old children would probably

not scare themselves with their own fantasy, but might still get caught
up in another's fantasy or in an interactional process.

Gould views

fluctuating certainty as a transitional step in the child's understanding
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of the differences between real and make-believe.

In terms of the

child's understanding of himself, Gould's data seems to indicate that
the child understands that his own self is not changeable via his own
fantasy before he understands that he is unchangeable via others fan
tasies.

The child might not scare himself after age 2% with his own

fantasy of being a witch.

However, another's fantasy that portrays one

as a witch may still be fairly real to the child of three or four.
Singer (1973), in a study of two to five year olds, seems to add
additional information to Gould's research.

Comparing a free play set

ting with a structured one, it was found that there was much more makebelieve play in the free play setting.

Within the free play setting,

Singer found an increasing amount of make-believe play with increasing
age from three to five years old.

Singer did not attempt to distinguish

how "real" the children's make-believe was, but simply noted that there
was more of it with increasing age.

The addition that Singer makes to

Gould's study may be that while make-believe is becoming less "real"
with increasing age, it is also becoming more abundant.

Perhaps there

is an elaboration of the symbolic function occurring such that makebelieve play, rather than evidencing a lack of a stable concept of self,
may serve to help the child differentiate himself and increase the sta
bility of his concept of self.
Tizard, Phelps and Plewis (1976) also found an increase in sym
bolic play with age for three and four year olds, but the correlation
between age and symbolic play was rather low (+.30) indicating again
that a good deal of individual differences were confounding any possible
'
developmental trends.
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Aggernaes and Haugsted (1976) in a study of experienced reality
in three to six year old children essentially found three year olds to
be quite different from the older children.

The three year olds exhib

ited a much greater tendency to experience imaginary items as being like
real items, as well as a tendency for magical thinking.

The children

were questioned about four kinds of real items and two kinds of imaginary
items.

The children's responses to questions were rated on a scale of

qualities of the objects (can it be touched, can it be seen, do others
see it, etc.).

Their scale indicated that the tendencies exhibited by

the three year olds declined a good deal by the age of four or five and
were gone for most of the children by age six.

This would seem to indi

cate that the fantasy world of children under age four may not be very
differentiated from their view of the real world.

This too would seem

to agree with the hypothesis that around age four, the world and self
become more differentiated even though the amount of make-believe play
engaged in may be increasing.
Schempp-Matthews (1977), working with four year olds, investi
gated whether children's fantasies were internally or externally gener
ated.

She found a fairly even balance between fantasy that was trig

gered by the external environment and that which was generated from
within by the child.

Though there is no data provided for other age

groups, these results would seem to indicate that at least four year
olds are readily open to fantasy play.

Since, according to Piaget, sym

bolic play does not begin until the child is a year and a half or two
years old, it would seem that between the ages of two and four, symbolic
thinking increases rapidly.

Before symbolic thought is available to the
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child, his play is oriented only to physically present objects which
only served to represent themselves.

With the beginning of symbolic

thought, the child can use one object to stand for another and compare a
present object with one imagined.

The child can also imagine himself as

different from his present state of being through make-believe.

Accord

ing to Schempp-Matthews' study it seems that this process is operating
'
very well by age four, since the child can equally draw from the environ
ment or create his make-believe solely from imagination without the
impetus of props.
Golomb and Brandt-Cornelius (1977) took research involving makebelieve one step further and investigated the effects of make-believe on
the conservation ability of four year old children.

The experimental

group of 15 nonconservers was given three sessions of symbolic play.
The control group of 15 nonconservers was also given three play sessions
'
but these were structured with puzzles, mosaics, and drawing.

On con

servation posttests, 13 of the children in the experimental group
improved in conservation ability, four of these obtaining full conserva
tion.

Only one child from the control group showed any positive change

toward conservation on the posttests.

The authors argue that the same

processes may be underlying both conservation and symbolic play.

Both

symbolic play and conservation involve reversibility and transformations.
In conservation tasks, a ball of clay is transformed into a sausage
shape, or a cup of water is transformed into a tall thin tube of water.
In symbolic play, the transformation is imaginary but one object becomes
another and is transformed into it.

In conservation, the concept of

reversibility is necessary to understand that the altered object can be
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put back the way it was originally.

In symbolic play, reversibility too

seems to be present as a broom can turn into a horse and then back into
a broom again.

The authors hypothesize that symbolic play may be an

important antecedent of operational reversibility.

If this is true, it

might also be true that symbolic play involving the self may be a pre
cursor to the attainment of a stable sense of self.

Transmutation of Animals and the Self

De Vries (1969) in what has now become a classic study,
attempted to investigate children's belief as to whether a living animal
can change into a different animal and to what degree this change is
believed by the children to be a real transformation.
64 boys aged three to six years.

The subjects were

They were shown an animal (cat) which

then changed identity via a mask to either a dog or rabbit while remain
ing in the child's presence.

The results showed a decrease in belief

that the transformation was real with an increase in age.

Other

Piagetian tasks given the children (conservation of number, length and
volume) correlated more strongly with generic identity constancy than
did discrimination measures used to determine if the children could
define and tell the differences between cats, dogs, and rabbits.

De

Vries concluded that constancy could not be attributed to acquisition of
knowledge or discrimination ability but was evidence of the kind of cog
nitive changes discussed by Piaget.

The measures of fear reaction to

the animal also seemed to indicate the reality of the children's belief
in the transformation which provides further evidence that the children's
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experience of reality is different from the adult's because of a quali
tatively different cognitive structure.
As a corollary to the main part of her study, De Vries (1969)
investigated children's reactions to the experimenter and the child him
self wearing an animal mask.

She found that this human identity task

was much easier for the children than the task involving the living ani
mal, though there was an increasing disbelief in the transformation with
increasing age of the child.

There were some problems with this task,

however, in that the masks were very unlifelike while the masks that the
animal wore were very lifelike.
rather difficult.

This makes comparison between the two

Another problem was that there were many more clues

available to help decide if a man has turned into a wolf, as opposed to
whether a cat has turned into a dog.

Nevertheless, 23% of the three

year olds and 6% of the four year olds failed to assert that they were
not a real chicken or wolf while wearing the masks.

Even with the

unrealistic masks, the younger children were still somewhat uncertain
that they could not change into an animal.

Another problem with this

portion of De Vries study was the scale which was used as a scoring sys
tem.

The scale consisted of:

(a) says he is not real chicken or wolf

while wearing mask, (b) says _E is not real chicken or wolf when .E wears
mask, (c) says _E is neither real chicken nor real wolf, (d) says he is
neither real chicken nor real wolf, (e) says _E is not chicken or wolf,
(f) and says IS is neither chicken nor wolf.

These distinctions seem to

be rather fine for a three to six year old child to be making with any
degree of understanding.

A simpler scoring system and one which is more

involved with the transformational nature of the situation might be more
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appropriate.

Perhaps if the masks were more realistic and some of the

other human characteristics (clothes, arms, legs) were covered, the data
for humans wearing a mask might be more similar to the data for the ani
mal wearing a mask.

As De Vries' data stand, they appear to support the

hypothesis that the sense of self as unchangeable occurs prior to the
attainment of the same concept regarding other living creatures.

This

seems to agree with Gould's (1972) observations of not believing ones
own fantasies beyond the age of three, but still believing those of
another.

Murray's (1969) data seem to contradict these studies though,

since on his conservation tasks the children were able to conserve a
ball of clay more easily than their own body.

This seems to question

whether conservation of self and sense of self as unchangeable are dif
ferent processes or occur at different ages or stages of cognitive
development.

The Purpose of the Present Study

The present study seeks to extend De Vries' (1969) and Murray's
(1969) work to measure children's understanding of both the transmut
ability of themselves and the conservation of their own bodies.

Though

it would seem that these two concepts would appear developmentally at
different ages, except for Murray's single report, there are no data
regarding children's development of conservation of self.

The concepts

of conservation of self and the immutability or stability of self do
share some common elements.

Both relate to possible changes in the body

while trying to determine if the body has really changed either in mass,
weight, length, or identity.
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Sometime between four and seven years of age a change occurs in
the way children think which provides them with a more adult perspective
about whether objects or they themselves can be transformed into some
thing different.

It is also during this time that the child moves

toward and enters the stage of concrete operations and begins to master
the conservation tasks.

It is hypothesized that there should be an age

progression toward a more stable and unchangeable sense of self, along
with an increased ability on the part of the child to conserve his own
body.

Conservation of external objects should be attained at a later

age than conservation of self.

It is not clear from the literature

whether these concepts will be correlated with one another, but if they
turn out to be, it would support a cognitive interpretation of makebelieve regarding the self and allow the child's development of a sense
of self to be understood in the same terms as the development of his
understanding of objects in the environment.
The literature does seem to indicate that make-believe play may
be connected to the development of cognitive abilities (Golomb & BrandtCornelius, 1977) and that some of Piaget's cognitive tasks may be
related to the child's understanding of the transmutability of animals
and the child himself (De Vries, 1969).

Further investigation into the

possibility of a connection between cognitive development, make-believe
play, and the child's sense of self seems warranted.

The following

research was designed to add further information toward an understanding
of a possible connection between the child's cognitive development, his
make-believe play, and the development of his sense of self.

CHAPTER II
METHODS
Subjects
Seventy children were involved in the study, 14 from each of
five age groups.

The age groups were 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 years old.

mean age, in months, for each of the age groups was:
77.1, and 89.2.

The

44.1, 55.4, 64.2,

Sex was equalized within each age group.

The younger

children were from a day care center, the older children from the Grand
Forks, North Dakota school system.

For all of the children, a signed

letter of permission was obtained from their parents, and no child was
forced to participate. The children were chosen at random from those
■
whose parents had given permission, until each of the age and sex categories were filled.

Appendix A provides a copy of the permission let

ters which were sent to parents.

Materials

H------------------------

A bird-like mask with breast plate was used as the costume.

It

covered the children from head to mid-thigh, excluding the arms of the
child (see Appendix B).

Eye holes allowed the children to see them

selves in a 24" x 48" mirror.
were:

The materials for the conservation tasks

Play Doh clay; two sticks 24" long, one of which could be bent at

two joints; an inclined plane measuring 24" long, 12" wide, and varying
in height from 1" to 7"; a bathroom scale; and a polaroid camera.
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Five
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sets of three drawings depicting a child, a child with an animal mask
on, and an animal were also used.

The pictures are depicted in Appendix

C.

Procedure

Each child was interviewed individually with only the experi
menter present.

The experimenter was previously unknown to the children.

There were three parts to the study.

The first involved the child wear

ing a costume and looking at himself in a mirror.

The second involved

conservation tasks where both external objects and the child's own body
were the objects of the conservation questions.

The third part involved

asking the child questions about pictures of people, animals, and people
in animal costumes.

All of the children in the study participated in

all three sections.

The three Sections were always presented to the

children in the same sequence; Part 1, Part 2, Part 3.

Total experi

mental time with each child was 10 to 15 minutes.

Part 1

(Transformation of Self)

Each child was taken individually and asked a few questions
about himself while looking in a full length mirror.

The questions

were:

How old are you?

"What is your name?

Are you a boy or a girl?

When you grow up will you be a mommy or a daddy?"

The child was then

asked, in the gender opposite to the response to the last question,
"Could you be a mommy (daddy) if you wanted?"

Then the bird costume was

presented and the child was asked, "What is it?"

If the child did not

respond correctly, or didn't know, the child was told that it was a bird.
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The child was then asked to put the costume on and look in the mirror.
Then the experimenter asked:
(child's name) or a bird?
bird?"

"What is that in the mirror?

Is that you

Are you a little boy (girl) or are you a

If the response to the last question was "bird," then the experi

menter asked the following:

"Can you fly?

(If the child flaps his arms)
are still on the ground.

(If yes)

Let me see you fly.

I see that you're trying to fly, but you

(Wait for explanation)

But don't birds fly?"

Then the child was asked to continue looking in the mirror to insure
that he was still viewing himself and asked, "If you are a bird,
what happened to the little boy (girl) that was just here?"

Finally,

all children were asked, "Are you really a bird or are you just pretend
ing?"

The experimenter recorded the children's responses to each of

the six questions pertinent to their wearing of the mask.
sheet is provided in Appendix D.

The scoring

This part of the study was also tape

recorded so that the children's responses could be double checked.

Part 2

(Conservation of Self and Objects)

Again, each child was interviewed individually.
tasks to this part of the experiment.

There were ten

The order of presentation was

randomly assigned to prevent any order effects.

There were four con

servation of length tasks, two involving external objects and two
involving the child's body.

Two wooden sticks were presented, one of

which could be bent in a zig-zag fashion.

The body correlate of this

task was the child comparing his two legs in the mirror and then bending
one and being asked again if they were still the same length or was one
now longer than the other.

The third conservation of length task
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involved comparing two equal length sticks placed on a flat table and
then placed on a wedge platform.

The fourth task was very similar

except instead of using sticks on the wedge, the child was asked to look
in the mirror at his legs and then to stand on the wedge platform and
again compare the length of his legs.
There were also four conservation of mass tasks.

One involved

clay, one used pictures of a child in several positions, and the two
others involved the child's own body.

A standard conservation of mass

task was employed, with two equal balls of clay being compared, and then
one of them being flattened into a pancake shape for a second comparison.
A similar conservation of mass task was employed using the child's hands
instead of the clay.

The comparison was made between one hand being

outstretched (pancake) and the other hand held in a fist (ball).

The

third conservation of mass task involved the child's entire body.

The

child compared him/herself in front of a mirror in a crouched position
(ball) and standing upright with arms and legs spread outward (pancake).
A possible problem was thought to exist in this third comparison how
ever, since the child could not view himself in the two positions simul
taneously.

An additional method was thus devised where polaroid pic

tures were taken of a child crouched and extended so that a direct vis
ual comparison was possible.

This picture comparison constituted the

fourth conservation of mass task and was considered an external task.
The conservation of weight tasks were also divided into one
using external materials and one using the child's own body.

For the

external conservation of weight task, two clay balls were used with one
being subsequently rolled into a sausage shape for a second comparison.
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In front of the mirror, the child then stood on a bathroom scale, both
in an erect position and while crouched down into a ball for a compari
son of the weight of his own body.

The format ard each of the questions

asked of the children for this part of the experiment are presented in
Appendix E.

Part 3

(Continuity of Person)

Before the tasks of this section began, a brief pretest was
given to insure that the childrep understood the concept of same and
different.

This pretest consisted of several matching tasks involving

geometric figures.

One example was the presentation of two squares and

a triangle and the child was asked to point to the two which are the
same.

All of the children involved in this study understood the concept

of same and different as assessed by this pretest.

Following the pre

test, the child was shown five sets of three pictures.

The series of

pictures all followed the format of one drawing of a person, one drawing
of an animal, and one drawing of a person with an animal mask on.

The

order in which the animal, person, and costumed person appeared was ran
domized among the five sets of pictures.
identify each picture.

The child was first asked to

After this description of the pictures, the

child was asked to look at the pictures and decide in a forced choice
which two were the same.

If the child picked the two people pictures as

the same, then it was assumed that the child understood the concept of
continuity of person.

If the ctiild picked the animal and the costumed

person as the same, then the child would seem to view the person as
being able to change into an animal, or at least more like an animal

than like the person.

The scoring sheet for parts 2 and 3 is provided

in Appendix F.

Scoring
Part 1
Responses to Part 1 were scored as either a one of zero for each
of the six questions which the child was asked while wearing the bird
costume.

The six questions were ordered in such a way that each suc

ceeding question should be harder to score a one if the child understood
that he had not become a bird but remained himself.

The results section

presents the outcome of a Guttman scalogram analysis to determine
whether the questions were indeed ordered by difficulty.

Part 2

The children's responses to the tasks of Part 2 were scored on a
pass-fail basis, depending on whether the child did or did not conserve.
If the child did not volunteer an explanation, the child was asked,
"why" following their initial answer.

Each of the conservation tasks

was scored separately.

Part 3

Responses to Part 3 were scored either 0 or 1, depending on
whether the child preserved the person, choosing the two human figures,
or whether the child chose the animal and the masked person as being the
same.

The range of scores on this section could thus vary from 0 to 5

for each child, since there were five picture series presented.
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Experimental Design
Part 1
Children's responses across age groups were compared to deter
mine if the age groups differed in their beliefs about the transforma
tion of self.

The Mann-Whitney U test was employed since the data were

ordinal in nature and the age groups were independent of one another.

Part 2

The children's responses across age groups were compared to
determine if the age groups differed in their ability to pass the con
servation tasks.

A Mann-Whitney U test was used for this analysis.

A

test was also performed across age groups comparing performance on the
external and all the body conservation tasks.

The external conservation

tasks were also compared with only the three entire-body conservation
tasks which used the child's entire body instead of just a part of the
child's body.

Both of these analyses employed the Wilcoxon Matched-

pairs Signed-ranks test.

A fourth analysis was performed within each

age group, comparing performance on the conservation of weight with per
formance on the conservation of mass with performance on the conserva
tion of length tasks.

A Friedman two-way analysis of variance test was

used for this analysis, since tbe data were ordinal and involved three
related samples.

A Spearman's rho correlation was also computed compar

ing the children's scores on Part 2 with their scores on Part 1.
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Part 3

The children's responses to the continuity of person task were
compared across age groups to determine if the age groups differed in
the way they responded to this task.

A Mann-Whitney U test was employed

since the data were ordinal and the groups were independent.

A Spear

man's rho correlation was also computed comparing the children's scores
on Part 3 with Part 1, and their scores on Part 3 with Part 2.

A Mann-

Whitney U test was used to test for sex differences on each of the three
parts of the experiment.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Based on Mann-Whitney U tests, there were no significant sex
differences in the way the children responded to any of the tasks in
this experiment.
each age group.

All further analysis thus combined the sexes within
The total score for each subject on each of the tasks

is presented in Appendix G.
The scale which was developed for Part 1 (Transmutation of Self)
was analyzed to assess whether children passing any specific item also
passed all of the preceding items.

A coefficient of reproducibility of

.983 was obtained, indicating that the questions did form a reproducible
Guttman scale.

Table 1 presents the scale questions and the manner in

which the children responded.
Using this scale as the basis of scoring the children's responses
to Part 1, only one of the age groups was significantly different from
the rest.

The four year olds scored significantly higher (less stability

of sense of self) than all other age groups (see Table 2).

The average

four year old responded that the image in the mirror was a bird, that it
was a bird and not he when he was called by name, and that he was a bird
and not a boy (girl).

The average three, five, six, and seven year old

said that it was a bird in the mirror, but did not deny their own name
nor sex.

The means and significance levels for each age group are

presented in Table 2.
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TABLE 1
PERCENTAGES BY AGE GROUP OF CHILDREN ANSWERING EACH QUESTION
IN THE DIRECTION OF "BIRDNESS" TO THE QUESTIONS OF PART 1
AGE
Questions

Three

N

Four

1i

Five

Six

Seven

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

1. Bird in Mirror

12

85

13

92

13

92

13

92

12

85

2. Bird over Name

5

35

13

92

8

57

6

42

6

42

3. Bird over Sex

1

7

7

50

4

28

4

28

3

21

4. Can Fly or Excuse
for not Flying

1

7

6

42

0

0

2

14

1

7

5. Excuse for Vanished
Boy/Girl
•

0

0l

3

21

1

7

2

14

3

21

6. Really Bird and
not Pretend

0

Ci

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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TABLE 2
MEAN AND MEDIAN SCORES PER AGE GROUP AND STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AGE GROUPS ON PART 1

Age

Three _
year X = 1.35
olds Mdn = 1.21

Four

Five

Six

Seven

U = 29.5**

U = 72

U = 78

U = 88

Four
year X = 3.00
olds Mdn = 2.50

-------

U = 49.5*

U = 49*

U = 44.5*

Five _
year X = 1.85
olds Mdn = 1.50

U = 49.5*

-------

U = 93

U = 110

Six
_
year X = 1.93
olds Mdn = 1.37

U = 49*

U = 93

-----

U = 88

Seven
year X = 1.78
olds Mdn = 1.25

U = 44.5*

U = 110

U = 88

** £<. .01

* £ <..05
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Four additional three year olds who were tested on Part 1
refused to put on the mask.

These four subjects were not included in

the analysis since there was no way to give them a score on this task.
Two of these children would not even allow the experimenter to put on
the mask.

No children in any other age group refused to participate.

On Part 2 (Conservation of Self and External Objects), a MannWhitney U test revealed that for total conservation scores, the seven
year olds scored significantly higher than the six year olds (U = 48,
£ < .05), significantly higher than the five year olds (U = 27.5, £ <
.01), significantly higher than the four year olds (U = 12.5, £ < .01),
and significantly higher than the three year olds (U = 10.5, £ < .01).
On the average, the seven year olds passed nearly six of the ten con
servation tasks while the other age groups passed three or less.

None

of the other age groups were significantly different from one another,
although their means presented in Table 3 indicate a clear progression
with age for these conservation tasks.
Several of the three year old children had to be tested twice on
the conservation tasks.

They initially responded in the affirmative to

whatever the experimenter said last.

This method of responding yielded

a spuriously high score for these few children on the conservation tasks.
Upon retesting, it was discovered that the children were indeed respond
ing in this way.

When questioned further, and the order of presenting

the choice of answers was altered, their responses indicated that they
were obviously not conserving.
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TABLE 3
A COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF BODY AND EXTERNAL CONSERVATION TASKS PASSED

Body Tasks

External Tasks
Number

Mean/
Median

All Tasks
Number

Mean/
Median

Number

Mean/
Median

14

10

.71
1.00

3

.22
.64

13

.93
.70

Four

14

13

.93
.70

11

.78
.79

24

1.71
1.50

Five

14

15

1.07
1.10

14

1.00
1.00

29

2.07
1.50

Six

14

25

1.80
1.10

19

1.36
1.00

44

3.16
1.30

Seven

14

39

2.78
3.50

43

3.07
3.10

82

5.85
6.83

All

70

102

1.46
1.07

90

1.28
.81

192

2.74
1.64

Age

n

Three
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Comparing the Body with the external conservation tasks, the
only statistically significant difference was for the three year old age
group (T = 4, £ < .05), based on the Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks
test.

This difference was in favor of the body conservation tasks

(i.e., three year olds conserved their body more frequently than they
did external objects).

However, as Table 4 indicates, the rate at which

the three year olds passed the conservation tasks was very low.

Out of

a possible 140 passes, only 10 body and 3 external conservation tasks
were passed.

Three body tasks accounted for 9 of the passes and it was

found that these three tasks were the ones that involved the child's
entire body.

The tasks using body parts (hands, legs) were not passed

more often than the tasks which used external objects.

A second analy

sis of external vs. entire-body conservation tasks was thus computed
using only those body tasks which involved the entire child this time.
For all ages combined, the difference was now highly significant (£ =
7.16, £ < .001).

As shown in Table 4, broken down by age groups, the

three year olds, five year olds, and six year olds were all significantly
higher on the body tasks, and the four year olds approached significance.
The seven year olds responses to the body and external tasks were still
essentially equivalent.
The conservation of weight, mass, and length tasks were also
compared for differences in pass rate by age group.

Based on a Friedman

Two-way Analysis of Variance, the rate of success was not found to be
significantly different for any of the three conservation categories
(X^ = 4.9, N.S.).

A Spearman's rho correlation was computed comparing

the scores of Part 1 with the total conservation scores of Part 2.

The
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TABLE 4
MEANS FOR ENTIRE-CHILD AND EXTERNAL CONSERVATION TASKS ALONG
WITH STATISTICAL DIFFERENCES BASED ON THE WILCOXON
MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST

Age

n

Entire-body tasks
(Means weighted by 5/3)

External tasks

T

£

X

X

3

8

1.07

.22

2,

.02

4

10

1.30

.78

12,

.11

5

10

1.67

1.00

5,

.02

6

11

2.02

1.36

7,

.02

7

13

2.85

3.07

49,

N.S.

correlation was positive but low and not statistically significant 0: =
.17,, N.S.).

A Spearman's rho correlation was also computed comparing

the entire-body conservation tasks with Part 1 scores.

This correlation

was also nonsignificant (£ = -.005, N.S.).
Taken as a whole, the data from Part 3 (Continuity of Person)
was unanalyzable by statistical methods.

A large enough percentage

(41%) of the children responded to the task in an unpredicted manner so
that the scoring system became unusable for all children.

Some of the

children's responses were such that they did not fit into the numbered
scoring system.

An attempt was made to separate out the children who

did respond in a scorable manner.

The criterion used was whether the

child's explanation of his answer referred to a general class rather
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than specific features of the pictures (e.g., both animals or both boys
was acceptable, while responses such as both have the same heads or both
have pink dresses were deemed unacceptable).
number of usable subjects fell to 41.

Using this criterion, the

These 41 children were comprised

of 10 three year olds, 9 four year olds, 7 five year olds, 8 six year
olds, and 8 seven year olds.
A Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed for
this subset of 41 children, and significant age differences were found
for the way these children responded on Part 3 (H = 11, £ < .05).

Using

a Mann-Whitney JJ test to compare each age group with every other, it was
found that the 3, 4, and 5 year olds responses were not significantly
different from one another.

As seen in Table 5, the six year olds

responses were significantly different from the five year olds, from the
four year olds, and from the three year olds.

Likewise, the seven year

olds were significantly different from the five year olds, from the four
year olds, and from the three year olds.

The six and seven year olds

were not significantly different from one another.

On the average, the

six and seven year olds responded to the task in the same way, they pre
served the continuity of person on four or more of the five tasks.

On

the average, the three, four, and five year olds preserved the continu
ity of person on only one or two of the five sets of pictures.
A Spearman's rho correlation was then computed using the sub
sample of 41 children to compare their scores on Part 3 with their
scores on Part 1.

The correlation was essentially zero (r

= .03, N.S.).

Spearman's rhos were also computed comparing the entire-body conserva
tion tasks with Part 3 (r

= -.15, N.S.) and the total conservation

39

TABLE 5
MEAN SCORES PER AGE GROUP AND MANN-WHITNEY U
FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AGES FOR PART 3

Age

Mean/
Median

Four

3

3.80
4.50

4

2.66
4.50

-

5

2.71
5.00

U = 31.5

6

.62
1.50

U = 21*

U = 16*

7

.62
1.37

U = 21*

U = 16*

U = 34

Five

Six

U = 26.5

U=

U = 31.5

U = 21*

U = 21*

U = 16*

U = 16*

-

7.2**

Seven

-

U =

7.5**

U = 32

U = 32

**£ < .05
* £ < .10

scores with Part 3 (r

= -.22, N.S.).

Both of these correlations were

in the expected direction, but nonsignificant.
Based on the significant differences between the ages on the
various tasks, the tasks seem to order themselves by age, in terms of
difficulty.

The mask task (Part 1, Transmutation of Self) would seem to

be mastered first, followed by the picture task (Part 3, Continuity of
Person) and entire-body conservation tasks (Part 2), in turn followed by
the external conservation tasks (Part 2).

To determine if the tasks

40
were passed in this sequence for each individual child, the tasks were
ordered into a scale.

The median score for each task was used as the

cutoff for passing the task.

Only the 41 subjects who responded in a

scorable fashion to Part 3 were included in this scaling attempt.
Scaled in the order presented above, a coefficient of reproducibility of
.872 was obtained.

This outcome was considered conservative, since

ordinal data were forced into nominal categories for the purposes of the
scaling.

It is also considered conservative since the number of sub

jects above and below the median was not always 50%, thus sometimes
leaving less than half of the Ss passing a task.

The occurrence of this

lower pass rate in the tasks scaled first and second worked against the
"goodness" of the scale since there were fewer "+"s on the first two
tasks and more later on.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Briefly, the results of Part 1 indicate that the four year olds
responded differently to questions about their identity while wearing a
mask than did any of the other age groups.

The four year olds seemed to

exhibit much more confusion about whether they could turn into a bird
than did the other children.

This task was not correlated with either

the children's conservation scores (Part 2) or their scores on a picture
task designed to measure continuity of person (Part 3).

The results

from Part 2 (Conservation of Self and External Objects) indicate that
the attainment of conservation concepts about one's own body as a whole
may occur earlier than these same concepts when the reference objects
are ones hands or legs or when they are external objects.

It was also

found that the seven year olds differed significantly from the other age
groups, demonstrating their increased ability to conserve.

The results

from Part 3 (Continuity of Person) seem to indicate that the six and
seven year olds preserved the concept of humanness on this task signifi
cantly more often than the younger children in this sample.

No sex dif

ferences were found on any of the tasks.
The hypothesis of a growing sense of self and a more differen
tiated concept of make-believe as opposed to "reality" is supported by
the data from Part 1.

The four year olds displayed a less stable sense

of self on the mask task than the five, six and seven year olds.
41

At
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first glance, the three year olds responses, which were similar to the
older children's, do not seem to fit into this explanation.

However,

several three year olds refused to participate in the mask task.

These

children were not less cooperative than other three year olds on the
other tasks, but they refused to put on the mask.

It seemed fairly

clear that these children were afraid of the mask and afraid to put it
on.

If this type of fear can be attributed to the other three year olds

who nevertheless went along with the experimenter's wishes, then it may
be that the three year olds who did participate in the mask task were
too frightened to allow themselves to engage in any fantasy regarding
the mask.

Perhaps it was simply too scary for them to "play" this game

It was also noted that all of the three year olds seemed relieved to
take off the mask after questioning, while a number of the older chil
dren wanted to remain wearing the mask and asked if there were other
masks that they could wear.

It may be that the three year olds accepted

the possibility of the mask changing them, to an equal or even greater
extent than the four year olds.

The difference may have been that the

three year old's fear of the situation overrode any tendency they had to
engage in make-believe while wearing the mask.

This fear threshold may

have been higher for the four year olds, so that they could more easily
allow themselves to "become birds."
In a discussion with the director of the day care center about
this hypothesis, she mentioned that around Halloween, the four and five
year old children really enjoyed putting on masks and pretending, but
most of the three year olds did not like Halloween and seemed to be gen
uinely afraid of the masks and costumes.

This fear theory is also
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somewhat consistent with that portion of De Vrie^ (1969) study in which
the experimenter and the children put on a mask.

De Vries found that

the three year olds were much more apt to believe that they could change
into the character of the mask than the four, five, and six year olds
when the children themselves were wearing the mask.

Although the pres

ent study singles out only the four year olds, it seems reasonable that
the real distinction is between the three to four year olds and the five
to seven year olds.

The evidence from Part 3 (Continuity of Person)

also seemed to imply that the older children (this time the six and seven
year olds) understood the concept of the permanence of the human form
while the younger children had much more difficulty with this concept.
This is not to say that there is a rapid transition point for any given
child or even groups of children.

The data here show a steady increase

with age for both the conservation tasks and the picture tasks.

What it

does seem to indicate is that between the age of four and five, most
children begin to more accurately differentiate their own being from
other people and the inanimate world, and accept it as an essential and
unchanging part of themselves.
If, as was hypothesized earlier, an increase in fantasy play
marks this increasing process of differentiation, then the data seem to
reinforce this notion.

The three and four year old children seemed much

more susceptible to the make-believe situation of putting on a mask.
After this age, the concepts of conservation of bodily self and person
permanence, despite an apparent transformation of the body and person,
began to develop more fully.

Most authors have written that fantasy

play tends to decrease from age five onward, and yet it is not until
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about age two that the symbolic function is developed to the extent that
it becomes usable by the child to engage in fantasy play.

It is between

the ages of two and five, then, that fantasy play is at its height in
children.

It seems more than coincidental that the differentiation of

self also seems to be occurring at this age and directly thereafter.
The results from Part 2 (Conservation of Self and External
Objects) seem to indicate that the conservation of self may be more com
plicated than it initially seemed.

The conservation of self as an

entire entity may occur prior to the same kinds of conservation tasks
involving external objects.

However, the conservation of body parts

(hands and legs) does not seem to be different from the conservation of
external objects.

Except for th^ seven year olds, younger children

apparently sense themselves as unchanging entities, but when confronted
with particular parts of themselves, they view these as they do external
objects.

The question, then, is not only self versus external conserva

tion, but whether or not the child has integrated his body parts as part
of the self.

The problem seems to go back to what Piaget (1962) men

tioned as the child's inability as yet to understand the concept of the
sum of the parts comprising the whole.

When the entire range of body

conservation tasks (including body parts) is considered, body conserva
tion does not appear to occur at an earlier age than conservation of
external objects.

But body conservation, involving only the child's

entire body, is mastered at a younger age than is conservation of exter
nal objects.

By the time the child is seven years old, this distinction

disappears since the child can now conserve both his body and external
objects to a much greater degree.

It may be that body parts, as opposed
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to the body as a whole, are conceptualized in a manner similar to exter
nal objects.

By the time a child is seven years old, he can conserve

body parts, since he can also conserve external objects at this age.
For younger children, the entire body (but not body parts) is differen
tiated and understood while body parts and external objects are not yet
conserved.
There were no significant differences in the number of children
who were able to conserve length, mass, and weight.

Theoretically, con

servation of length, mass, and weight should appear developmentally in
this order.

These tasks were not so ordered in the present study, prob

ably because of the young age of many of the subjects.

The few conser

vation tasks that were passed by the younger children were scattered
among the three conservation areas and were largely due to the conserva
tion of entire-body tasks, of which there were three, one each involving
conservation of length, mass, and weight.

Generally, the great vari

ability on these tasks for the younger children and the higher pass rate
for the three entire-body tasks, than the more conventional external
conservation tasks, accounts for the lack of significant differences
between the three conservation areas.
The conservation tasks did not correlate with the mask task
(Part 1).

Earlier research (De Vries, 1969; Gould, 1972; Murray, 1969)

seemed to indicate that these two areas might not be correlated if the
ages at which the children mastered the two concepts differed too much.
In this way, one task could be fully mastered before the other task
began to get passed.

Then no matter what score the child obtained on

the second task, his score on the first task would always be the same so

46
that there could be no relationship between the tasks and the correla
tion would be zero.
here.

To some extent, this seems to be what has occurred

Another explanation may be that the two areas are separately

developing concepts, although the work of Golomb and Brandt-Cornelius
(1977), who found that make-believe play sessions raised scores on con
servation tasks, would seem to dispute this.

More likely, it seems that

the kind of self differentiation that allows the child to clearly sepa
rate reality from make-believe is an earlier developing concept than is
conservation.

It also seems to be an earlier developing concept than

the concept of preservation of humanness as a general construct, if the
third part of the present study can be taken as indicative of this.

The

picture task used here (Part 3) seemed to be tapping children's under
standing of the preservation of humanness as an unchanging ability.

On

this task, the 3, 4, and 5 year olds were significantly different from
the 6 and 7 year olds, while on the mask task (Part 1) the 3 and 4 year
olds (if it can be conceded that the 3 year olds were too fearful to
engage in make-believe in this setting) responded significantly different
than the 5, 6, and 7 year olds.

However, none of the tasks were signif

icantly correlated with one another.

This makes it difficult to suppose

an underlying process of cognitive development which these tasks have in
common.
ficulty.

Nonetheless, they do seem to order themselves in terms of dif
When the children were divided into those who scored above and

those who scored below the median score for each task, the tasks formed
a reasonably reproducible scale (coefficient of reproducibility = .872).
Table 6 presents the tasks in order, with the addition of the development
of gender identity based on Kohlberg's (1966) study and the fact that
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TABLE 6
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE OF THE CHILD’S SENSE OF SELF,
BASED ON KOHLBERG (1966) AND THE PRESENT STUDY

1. Gender Identity

2 and 3 year olds different from older children.

2. Mask on Self

3 and 4 year olds different from older children.*

3. Pictures of Human
Transformatiorl

3, 4, and 5 year olds different from older
children.

4. Entire-Body
Conservation

3, 4, and 5 year olds different from older
children.

5. External
Conservation

3, 4, 5, ,and 6 year olds different from older
children.

*see text for explanation

only two children in the present study claimed that they could become an
opposite sex parent when they grew up.

As illustrated, gender identity

seems to develop first, followed by the mask task, and then the picture
task and the conservation of the child's entire body.

Conservation of

the child's body parts and external objects is a later developing abil
ity.
However, it must be reiterated that the tasks in this study were
not significantly correlated with one another.

Though the scaling indi

cates that they are ordered in terms of difficulty, it does not indicate
that one task is a precursor to the next task.

It might be, as Golomb

and Brandt-Cornelius (1977) suggest, that make-believe is a precursor to
conservation, but the two still remain uncorrelated in this study, at
least.

The age difference between when the children attain the concepts
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of each of the tasks would have to be almost completely separate.

It

could be argued that the conservation task was largely directed toward
the six and seven year old children while the mask task was directed
more toward the three and four year old children.
seem to indicate that this is the case.

The results would

But if that is true, it leaves

any possible relationship between the two open only to speculation.
The picture task (Part 3), which should occur between the mask
task and conservation, was also uncorrelated with both.

Perhaps though,

with all of the difficulty encountered with the scoring of the picture
task (Part 3) the results obtained on that section of the study should
be treated with much caution.

In any case, it would seem unwise to

expect any kind of picture task to represent the child's sense of self.
Although the preservation of humanness would seem to be related to one's
sense of self, it appears that these concepts, at least as measured
here, are not related.

It would seem that the preservation of humanness

in people in general is different from how one experiences oneself.
"Self" may be a much more abstract concept than "human," in that the
concept of "human" (as opposed to cat or horse) is a more easily defin
able category.

Although the children could relate pictures one to

another, they probably did not relate the concept of humanness to them
selves.

The children dealt with the specific pictures in a concrete

manner and did not seem to make the conceptual leap that the concept
applies to all humans including themselves.
pected from preoperational children.

This would not be unex

The use of pictures with this age

group may simply be asking too much from the children, since children of
these ages tend to deal with concrete and specific objects without
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generalizing them to classes of objects.

To them, the pictures did not

refer to anything but the specific object, animal, or person that each
picture portrayed.

To the adult, the pictures are symbols that stand

for whole sets of objects.

To the young child, the pictures do not rep

resent a larger class but only a specific object or person (Piaget,
1962).
.

Generally, the results here do not specifically support nor dispute Piaget, but may add to his theory of cognitive development as it
applies to the development of the child's concept of self.

Pretending

one is a bird in the mask task is indicative of a preponderance of
assimilation occurring.

Choosing the masked person and animal as the

same on the picture task is one step removed from the live situation and
the set of the task itself (choose two) forces the child toward using
more adaptive thought.

And, of course, to pass the conservation tasks,

the child must be using both assimilation and accommodation on a more
equal basis.

The results seem to order these tasks in a manner that

Piaget might predict based on the child's increasing equilibrium between
assimilation and accommodation as he grows older.

That the tasks are

uncorrelated may indicate that they do not represent a continuous dimen
sion.

Each of the tasks is not a precursor to the next.

But the lack

of correlation does not preclude that there may yet be an underlying
pattern of cognitive development that accounts for their order of diffi
culty.

The rise of the symbolic function around age two essentially

disrupts a kind of sensori-motor equilibrium that the child attained up
to this point.

Then through the ages of 3, 4, and 5, the symbolic func

tion helps the child structure his world again, but this time relating
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specific present with certain past experiences.

The symbolic function

allows a greater time lag between these comparisons, and also allows the
child to distort and shape his reality to his own egocentric thought.
As the child gets older, his thought becomes less distorting and more
conventional in terms of shared realities with other people.

Later

still, as the child enters concrete operations, he begins to expand his
comparisons between specific objects until he forms general classes of
objects and the symbols he uses begin to represent a class of objects
rather than one specific object.
The concept of self may follow this same sequence of development
after the first differentiation of the self from the world, although it
is at the same time easier and more difficult for the child.

It is eas

ier because the self is always present and it is through interactions of
the self with the world that the child begins to understand the world.
Objects in the world come and go as the child moves about, but his body
and ego remain present.

Thus, the self is an "object" with which the

child has a great deal of experience.

But the self would also seem to

be more difficult to understand than an external object since it cannot
be directly compared with itself in the present in the same way two cars
or two blocks can be compared.

An interesting speculation is whether

the child compares himself with other people, perhaps peers or parents.
Perhaps when a child is imitating others, he is trying to understand
both himself and them.

That the children are attempting to understand

themselves as well as other people would seem to be a reasonable expla
nation for their imitation.

Of course, it would also tie into Piaget's

theory that young children act put their thoughts and rehearsals through
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action schemes while older children and adults imitate and rehearse
through imagination.

Imitation in children may be an action schema that

the children use to try and understand the world.

It would certainly be

of interest to measure developmentally children's tendency for imitation.
Amount of imitation would probably be expected to be curvilinear much
like the amount of fantasy play exhibited by children.

It might steadi

ly increase to a certain age and then begin to appear less frequently.
If imitation too could be understood in terms of cognitive development
and the child's increasing understanding of himself and the world, play
in all its aspects could be united under one theory.

The three theories

of play; as a cognitive function, as practice (imitation) for future
activities, as an emotional release, would all be subsumed under a
theory of cognitive processing.

Even the child's fantasy play that

seems to be directed by emotional situations or conflicts could be
related back to the child's attempts to understand himself in relation
to other significant people in his environment.

This is not to say that

this activity is directed only to the child's understanding of himself,
or that it is limited to the ages of from three to five.

Fantasy based

on emotionally charged situations and imitation are a continuing process
used throughout life to cope with situations that one doesn't understand.
But in terms of the child's sense of self as a permanent psychological
entity, these processes (fantasy imitation and emotional discharge) all
seem to come together during the ages of three to five as this concept
is developing.

It may be that the concept of self is a very rapidly

developing concept around the age of three or four years.

The child has

great experience with himself, but until the rise of the symbolic
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function it is difficult for him to compare himself with himself or
others who are not present.

All of the experimentation that the young

child does with external objects he must do with himself.

In a large

part, this experimentation may be represented by make-believe play and
imitation.

Based on the present data, an increase in sense of self

coincides with other data (Singer, 1973; Tizard et al., 1976) indicating
an increase in make-believe play from ages three to five.

In this study,

conservation of ones own body also seems to occur during this time,
while conservation of other objects doesn't appear until later.

By age

six or seven the children preserve a sense of humanness in pictures
despite appearances of transformation.

Between the ages of three and

five the child's knowledge of himself seems to expand rapidly.
The child's understanding of his own gender constancy also seems
to appear during the same age range as other measures of sense of self.
The child's gender identity develops earlier, around age two, but chil
dren do not perceive this gender as something permanent and unchangeable
about themselves until about age three.

The children do not view a pic

tured person's sex as constant until about age six or seven (Emmerich,
1973; Kohlberg, 1966).

So, in gender identity studies, too, the child's

understanding of self occurs prior to his understanding of others.
Whether the child's fantasy play is important in the child's
development of gender identity seems as yet unexplored.
would certainly seem to exist.

The possibility

Perhaps what other authors have called

practice play in children (dressing up, playing mother, father, fireman,
nurse, etc.), may actually be classified more generally as make-believe
and serve the same function for the child as pretending to be superman,
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spiderman, or even a horse or dog.

The classification of practice play

may not even be a relevant category of play if there is no functional
difference between these practice play episodes and other fantasy play
activities.

The distinction is from an adult point of view and even

then based on content and relationship to a possible future reality
rather than the child's current experience and dealings with the world.

Implications fbr Childcare Workers

There seem to be many implications of this view of play and of
the child's conceptualization of self occurring prior to similar con
cepts about the environment.

In terms of our understanding of children

in general, it would be very parsimonious if a cognitive theory of devel
opment could account for the myriad behaviors that occur during the
young child's life.

An understanding of the way children deal with

their world and the cognitive tools which they possess to help them do
this, would be very beneficial to anyone trying to help children in
either an educational or clinical setting.

In a day care or educational

setting, the Golomb and Brandt-Cornelius (1977) study, where increased
fantasy play produced increased conservation abilities, would seem to
point the way.

During the ages of three to five, make-believe and fan

tasy play may be an important precursor to later conservation skills.
Make-believe play might also help to more fully develop the child's
sense of self and make him better able to cope with and understand social
situations that might be different for young children.

Make-believe and

fantasy play could be encouraged with this age group to help the chil
dren consolidate their sense of self.

Fantasy play could also benefit
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the children as an aid in teaching them not only about themselves, but
about the world in general.

If make-believe helps the child understand

himself and if an understanding of self precedes an understanding of the
world, then both of these may be useful agents to help the child learn
in any type of educational setting.
Since the use of allegory or metaphors is an effective technique
in therapy with adults (desensitization), perhaps it is because it is
analogous to fantasy play, an earlier mode of functioning (Singer, 1971).
It is safer to try things out in fantasy and to think about an analogous
situation to ones own in seeking an answer to a problem in living.

Per

haps there is more involved than an escape from the pressures of the
real situation.

It may be that this process has served and continues to

serve people throughout their lives.

Directions for Future Research

Looking back at this study, some comments for future work seem
appropriate.

Comparing the mask task used by De Vries (1969) with the

children and the mask task employed here, it seems that we made things
unnecessarily difficult for ourselves.

Asking the children whether they

turned into a wolf or chicken, as De Vries did, or a bird as was done
here seems to be pushing this phenomena to the extreme.

De Vries com

mented, and it applies here too, that the masks were not very realistic
looking.

She found this to be a problem in comparing the human transmu

tation task with the animal transmutation task.

Here it was less of a

problem and, in fact, the mask was intentionally not constructed to be
very realistic.

To present the children with a costume that would
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visually transform them into a real-looking animal would defeat the
intended purpose of this study.

The question is not whether children

can be convinced that they can change, but whether they themselves
believe it at some time during the normal course of development.

A

realistic looking costume would not be representative of the child's
normal play experience and, thus, not representative of the child's
developing thought.

Realistic-looking costumes simply are not avail

able to children and it would be unreasonable to expect a child's reac
tion to one to represent normal cognitive development in the child.

One

way in which future research might move is to get away from animal masks
altogether and use human masks.
a good example.

An old man and old woman mask might be

This kind of change of identity might be easier for the

children to get involved in and would certainly add a new dimension to
the mask task.

As an example of what we are asking children to do, sup

pose De Vries put a human mask on her cat instead of a dog or rabbit
mask.

Her results might be very different.

Perhaps children acquire

the concept that they can not change into an animal at one age, but they
may still regard themselves as changeable within the realm of humanity.
Another possibility might be to present the child with a choice of masks
to try on.

In this way, the children might select a mask that they

could more easily pretend with than one arbitrarily chosen by the exper
imenter.

It might also be interesting to see if children of different

ages choose differently between animal and human masks.

A choice would

certainly seem to facilitate the child's freedom to engage in makebelieve.
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As presented, the mask task has little to do with the child's
normal make-believe behavior.

Usually make-believe arises spontaneously

during play, sparked by either an external prop or the child's own
thoughts (Schempp-Matthews, 1977).

To bring a child into a room and ask

him questions about himself and then have him try on a mask and ask more
questions about him is a far cry from the child's normal experience of
make-believe.

Most of the children interviewed merely stood in front of

the mirror and looked passively at themselves without moving.

In day-to-

day make-believe play activities, the children are usually very physi
cally active.

Allowing the child a choice of several masks and encour

aging movement might help free the child to become more active since he
would have a hand in deciding what the make-believe might be.
As was mentioned earlier, the questions asked of the children
while they were wearing the mask formed a very good Guttman scale.

No

scoring or interpretation was necessary since the questions themselves
represented the scale.

It seems that the questions used could easily be

modified for use with a different mask (even human) and a group of
scales could be developed if a choice of masks were offered the child.
If an experimenter wished to use a more relaxed free-play setting with
the children, the scale questions could also be incorporated into a less
formal conversation.

Singer's (1973) research indicates that more make-

believe occurs in a free-play setting than a structured one.

Perhaps a

free-play situation with masks available would be a good choice for
further research in this area.
only be considered inferential.

In any case, the work done this far can
Much more work in this area needs to be

57

done before a clear understanding of the development of children's sense
of self is attained.

APPENDIX A

PERMISSION LETTERS SENT TO PARENTS
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THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA
Grand Forks 58201
Department of Psychology

Telephone: (701) 777-3451

Dear Parent,
Often, during play, children pretend to be someone or something dif
ferent than themselves. 1 am currently studying children's beliefs
about their ability to become something other than themselves. Essen
tially, I am trying to discover how real children believe their makebelieve to be. I will be working with children from age 3 to 8. With
your permission, I would like to be able to talk with your child while
he/she is at United Day Care. It will take about 15 minutes of the
child's time, and no child will be forced who does not want to partici
pate.
The study will involve trying on a costume and looking at oneself
in a mirror. Questions will be asked as to whether he/she has changed
into what the costume is, or whether they are still a boy/girl. Then a
few tasks will be done to see if the child believes that body parts
(hands, legs, arms) can change size. These tasks will be compared to
similar ones involving common external objects.
In this way, I hope to
find out whether children understand concepts about themselves earlier
or later than they do concepts about the external world.
Your child will at no time be endangered, and no intelligence or
psychological testing will be done. We hope to make the experience
enjoyable for the children. If you are willing to allow your child to
participate, please sign below and return to United Day Care.
Thank you,

Craig Stevens, M.A.

Stevens' Make-believe Study
You may ask my child, _________ _
Signed _______________________
Date

to participate.
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THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA
Grand Forks 58201
Department of Psychology

Telephone: (701) 777-3451

Dear Parent,
I am a graduate student at the University of North Dakota working
on my dissertation project in psychology. I am doing a study on young
children's beliefs about their ability to become something other than
themselves. Make-believe or pretend occurs often in children's play and
I am interested in how real this make-believe seems to the children them
selves. I am working with children from 3 to 8 years of age. I would
like to be able to spend about 15 minutes with your child while he/she
is at Saint Michaels school. No child will be forced who does not want
to participate.
The study will involve trying on a costume and looking at oneself
in a mirror. Questions will be asked as to whether he/she has changed
into what the costume is, or whether they are still a boy/girl. Then a
few tasks will be done to see if the child believes that body parts
(hands, legs, arms) can change size. These tasks will be compared to
similar ones involving common external objects. In this way, I hope to
find out whether children understand concepts about themselves earlier
or later than they do concepts about the external world.
Your child will at no time be endangered, and no intelligence of
psychological testing will be done. I hope to make the experience enjoy
able for the children. If you have objections to your child partici
pating in this study, please call me, Craig Stevens, at 777-3451 or the
principal of St. Michael's school.
Thank you very much,

Craig Stevens, M.A.
Psychology Department
University of North
Dakota

APPENDIX B

BIRD-LIKE COSTUME USED
IN PART 1
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APPENDIX C
THE FIVE SETS OF THREE PICTURES USED IN PART 3

APPENDIX D

SCORING SHEET FOR PART 1
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Scoring for Part 1

AGE

NAME
SEX

1.

Bird in mirror

Yes

No

.

Bird over name

Yes

No

3.

Bird over boy/girl

Yes

No

4.

Can fly, or excuse
Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

2

for not flying

5.

Excuse for what
happened to boy/girl

6.

Really a bird and
not pretend

APPENDIX E

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND QUESTIONS ASKED THE CHILDREN
DURING PART 2 (CONSERVATION OF SELF AND
EXTERNAL OBJECTS)
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1.

Sticks on Wedge.

Stand two equal length sticks on a table

directly in front of the child.

Say, "Are these two sticks

the same size, or is one longer than the other?"
an affirmative answer.

Wait for

Then place the two sticks on the

wedge, one at the top and one at the bottom.

Say, "Now look

at the sticks, are they the same size, or is one stick longer
than the other?"

2.

Child on Wedge.
in the mirror.

Record response then ask "why?"

Have the child stand up and look at himself
Say, "Look at your legs, are they the same size,

or is one leg longer than the other?"
say that they are the same.
in front of the mirror.

Wait for the child to

Have the child stand on the wedge

Say, "Look at your legs now.

the same size, or is one leg longer than the other?"

Are they
Record

response and then ask "why?"
3.

Sticks that Bend.
each other.

Line the two sticks up, straight, parallel to

Ask the child, "Are these two sticks the same length?"

Wait for the child to say that they are the same.
stick in a zig-zag fashion.

Then bend one

Then say, "now are the sticks the same

length or is one longer than the other?"

Record response and then

ask "why?"
4.

Legs that bend.

Have the child stand up in front of the mirror.

Say, "Look at your legs, are they just as long as each other, or
is one leg longer than the other?"
are the same length.

Wait for the response that they

Ask the child to stand on one leg with the
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other bent at the knee.

Say, "Look at your legs now.

Are they just

as long as each other, or is one leg longer than the other?"

Record

response and ask "why?"

5.

Clay Ball & Pancake (Conservation of Mass).

Present the child with

two balls of clay and ask if he thinks the two have the same amount
of clay in them.

If not, change them or let the child change them

until the child says they are equal.

Add or take away as the child

wants, but make sure they retain their round shape.
one ball into a pancake.

Then flatten

Say, "Is there more clay here (point to

ball), more clay here (point to pancake), or is there the same amount
of clay in both?"

6.

Record response and ask "why?"

Child Crouched vs. Arms & Legs Spread.

Have the child stand in

front of the mirror, with arms and legs spread out.
the child does not understand.

Demonstrate if

Then have the child crouch down into

a ball and look at himself in the mirror.

Say, "Was there more of

you when you had your arms and legs spread out or when you were in a
ball, or was there the same amount of you both times?"

If the child

does not seem to understand, have him stand spread out and crouched
again, as you ask the question.

7.

Fist vs. Outstretched Palm.
with palms up.

Record response and ask "why?"

Have the child extend both hands, open,

Demonstrate if necessary.

Say, "Is there more of
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you in one hand than the other, or are both hands just the same
amount?"

Wait for answer that they are the same.

Then have the

child make one hand into a fist while the other remains open.

Say,

"Now is there more of you in one hand than the other, or are both
hands just the same amount?"
'
8.

Clay Ball & Sausage (Conservation of Weight).

Present two balls of

clay and ask the child if he thinks that if you weighed them the two
balls would weigh the same.

Add or remove clay from one of the balls

until the child thinks that they would weigh the same.

Then roll

one of the balls into a sausage shape and put it back on the table
next to the ball of clay.
now?

Shy, "What would happen if I weighed them

Would this one (ball) be heavier, or would this one (sausage)

be heavier, or would they weigh the same?"

Record response and ask

"why?"

9.

Child Crouched vs. Standing Straight.

Place a scale in front of

the mirror and ask the child to stand on the scale, standing
straight, looking at himself in the mirror.
how much he weighs.

Then have the child crouch down into a ball,

while remaining on the scale.
reading.)

Then, tell the child

(Don't let the child see the scale

Say, "Do you think that you weigh more now, or less, or

do you weigh just the same as you did before?"
ask "why?"

Record response and
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10.

Photograph Comparison.

Show the child two photographs of a same

sex child, one in which the child is standing with arms and legs
spread out and the other with the child crouched down into a ball.
Lay the photographs side by side and name the child saying, "These
are two pictures of Billy (Sue)."

Then say, "Is there more of

Billy (Sue) in this picture, or in this picture, or is there just
the same amount of Billy (Sue) in both pictures?"
and then ask "why?"

Record response

APPENDIX F

SCORING SHEET FOR PARTS 2 AND 3
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NAME ________________________________

DATE _______

SEX ____________

BIRTH ______
AGE ________

ORDER _______________________________

Length 1.

Mass

Sticks on wedge............ Pass

Fail

2.

Child on wedge............

Pass

Fail

3.

Sticks that bend..........

Pass

Fail

4.

Legs that bend............

Pass

Fail

Clay ball and pancake.....

Pass

Fail

Pass

Fail

outstretched palm......... Pass

Fail

Child photographs.........

Pass

Fail

Pass

Fail

Pass

Fail

5.
6.

Child crouched vs.
arms & legs spread........

7.

8.
Weight 9.
10.

Hand in fist vs.

Clay ball & sausage.......
Child crouched vs.
standing straight.........

PICTURES
1. ______

0 = Humans

2. ______

1 = animals

3. ______
4. ______
5.

APPENDIX G
TOTAL SCORES FOR EACH SUBJECT FOR EACH TASK
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Conservation
Mask Task

Entire-Body

3

1

0

0

1

3

4

i

1

0

3

1

o

0

0

3

1

a

0

0

3

0

a

2

0

3

2

i

1

0

3

2

2

2

1

3

1

1

2

1

3

1

1

1

0

3

1

0

0

0

3

2

0

0

3

2

J)

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

3

1

1

1

0

4

2

2

3

1

4

2

t

3

2

4

5

0

0

0

4

1

6

0

1

4

2

2

2

1

4

4

b

0

0

4

3

0

0

0

f

Limbs/Body

External

Age
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Conservation
s

Sex

Age

Mask Task

Entire-Body

Limbs/Body

External

Pictures

22

M

4

2

1

1

0

0

23

M

4

3

1

1

1

0

24

M

4

4

1

1

1

3

25

M

4

5

1l

1

1

4

26

M

4

2

p

0

1

5

27

M

4

2

a.

1

2

5

28

M

4

5

0

0

0

5

29

F

5

3

0

0

0

5

30

F

5

3

1

1

0

5

31

F

5

2

0

0

0

5

32

F

5

1

2

2

2

0

33

F

5

1

2

2

1

5

34

F

5

3

1

1

0

5

35

F

5

4

1

1

2

0

36

M

5

1

1

1

1

0

37

M

5

1

2

2

3

5

38

M

5

1

1

2

2

5

39

M

5

2

2

2

3

4

40

M

5

1

1

1

0

4

41

M

5

2

0

0

0

0

42

M

5

1

0

0

0

5

,
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Conservation
Age

Mask Task

Entire-Body

Limbs/Body

External

6

2

2

3

3

6

1

2

3

3

6

5

1

1

0

0

6

2

3

5

4

0

6

1

0

0

1

0

6

1

0

0

0

0

6

1

1

1

0

5

6

1

2

4

2

5

6

2

1

1

0

5

6

5

1

1

0

5

6

3

1

1

2

1

6

1

3

5

4

0

6

1

0

0

0

0

6

1

0

0

0

5

7

1

3

4

3

0

7

1

2

4

4

5

7

2

0

0

2

0

7

1

0

0

2

2

7

1

2

3

3

0

7

4

2

4

3

0

7

5

1

1

3

1
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Conservation

£

Sex

Age

Mask Task

Entire-Body

64

M

7

1

/

J

65

M

7

1

66

M

7

67

M

68

External

Pictures

3

5

5

i
l

4

4

0

2

jL

1

0

0

7

4

3

4

4

5

M

7

1

3

5

5

0

69

M

7

1

1

2

2

3

70

M

7

0

2

4

3

0

Limbs/Body
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